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COMES NOW, the Appellant Spokane Structures, Inc. ("SPOKANE
STRUCTURES"), and pursuant to the rules of the Court submits this Reply Brief in
response to the Respondent's Brief.

ARGUMENT
1.
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT'S MISTATEMENT OF FACTS
"All truths are easy to understand once they are discovered;
the point is to discover them." Galileo Galilei
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT, L.L.C. ("EQUITABLE INVESTMENT") stated
(bold face):
Respondent's Brief, pp. 2-3: "Spokane Structures prepared a contract
entitled "Buildffiesign Agreement" that it had used in previous
projects. (Id.) Equitable requested inclusion of a construction cost
ceiling provision."
Respondent's Brief, p. 5: "It has long be [sic] held that any ambiguities
in a contract are to be construed against the drafter."
Although it is true that the document was drafted by SPOKANE STRUCTURES,
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT actually drafted the "not to exceed $605,000.00." (CR. 74
para. 8) Furthermore, "Linda Tomblin represented that the phrase added by her attorney
only related to the design as existed on that date ... " Id. The ambiguity should be
interpreted against EQUITABLE INVESTMENT.
Respondent's Brief, p. 3: "Thus, the contract is the undisputed
centerpiece of this dispute."
This allegation is absolutely false. The centerpiece of the dispute is that the
contractor was not reimbursed for expenditures made for services rendered for
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT by design professionals and engineers. The relationship
begins with designing one project and ends with another project, all requested by

APPELLANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 1

EQUITABLE INVESTMENT. (See CR. 74, para. 8, 9) The crux of the case is that
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT refused to pay for the services and yet kept the plans, the
work product of the service. (CR. 77, para. 16)
Respondent's Brief, p. 3: "The contract authorized written change
orders to the project once construction was underway." (Respondent's
Brief, p. 3)
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT's citation refers to the "Design/Build Agreement."
Regretfully, EQUITABLE INVESTMENT's paraphrasing implies that the change order
provision only applies when construction was underway. Actually, the "Design/Build
Agreement" says "[c]hange orders will be handled in writing only, and billed at cost of
change plus 20% profit and overhead." (CR. 85, para. last)
Respondent's Brief, p. 3: "Equitable tendered $2,500.00 as
consideration for the draft plans."
Again, EQUITABLE INVESTMENT cites to the "Design/Build Agreement"
again. The "Design/Build Agreement" says nothing about a "tender" or the purpose of
the "tender." What it does say is that "$2,500.00 retainer required to be paid "for the
plans," ... "should financing not be obtained." (CR. 85, p. last) It has never been
contested that financing was obtained. The Banker's deposition confirms financing was
available. (CR. 178, 11. 3-5 and 180 II. 3-6)
Respondent's Brief, p. 3: "In the event Equitable could not obtain
financing for the project, it agreed to pay Spokane Structures another
$2,500.00." (Id.)
Although more or less an accurate quotation, the innuendo is incorrect.
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT wants this Court to believe only $5,000.00 was due. But
the $5,000.00 only applies to a lack of financing (CR. 85, para. last), not changing design
and requesting substantially more work for two new designs.
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Respondent's Brief, p. 3: "When Equitable declined to sign the
contract to commence construction, suit followed. In its Complaint,
Plaintiff does not allege the contract is ambiguous, but rather, that
Equitable breached an 'enforceable contract."' (CR. 013.)
The Complaint (CR. 013) does not say why the suit was filed or limit recovery to
an enforceable contract, but the record does reveal that SPOKANE STRUCTURES wants
to get paid for expenses requested by EQUITABLE INVESTMENT for the new design.
(See Affidavit, R 72-77, and Exhibit "M") As far as the Complaint, it contains five
"alternative or additional" claims. (See CR. I 8, para. 1-5) On the very page cited by
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT, paragraph 5 says "SPOKANE STRUCTURES conferred
a benefit to EQUITABLE INVESTMENT and is entitled compensation for the benefit."
(CR. l 3, p 5) Obviously, the Complaint is not based solely on a claim "that
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT breached an 'enforceable contract."'
Respondent's Brief, p. 6: "The contract expressly provided that the
cost of construction was not to exceed $605,000.00, "which includes all
costs associated with construction, including overhead and profit."
(CR. 085.)
The "Design/Build Agreement" does not expressly provide a cap. It clearly
allows change orders, and the e-mails and new design certainly show changes in design
and cost were handled in writing with the agreement of both parties. (See Lewis
Affidavit, CR. 72)
Respondent's Brief, p. 8: "The contract unambiguously required, as a
condition precedent to commencing construction, agreement between
Equitable and Spokane Structures as to the final design and cost of
construction."
Not true. The "Design/Build Agreement" states a "final cost of construction will
be provided." (CR. 85 para. last) SPOKANE STRUCTURES provided such in a
supplemental and more finalized document, but it was not required. The only

APPELLANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 3

unambiguous condition to construction was financing, and it is uncontested that financing
was available.
Respondent's Brief, p. 10: "As already noted, the theory underlying
Equitable's summary judgment motion was that failure to agree to a
cost of construction was fatal to the going forward with the project."
Failure to agree on a cost of construction could be found to be true by a trier of
fact, after a full and fair trial, but at this date it is contested. Even if a trier of fact did
determine that no enforceable contract existed, then equity demands that expenses
expended for the benefit of a party should be paid.
Vladamir Lenin once said, "A lie told often enough becomes the truth." Luckily,
in this country, we have a judicial system that demands the truth and the whole truth.
2.

EOUIT ABLE INVESTMENT'S MISTATEMENT OF THE CITED LAW
At page five of its Reply Brief, EQUITABLE INVESTMENT cites to Rath v.
Managed Health Network, Inc., 123 Idaho 30, 844 P.2d 12 (1992) as standing for the

proposition that determinations as to whether a contract is ambiguous should be made
from the express language of the contract and without resort to extrinsic evidence.
However, the cited case bears no resemblance to this proposition, though it does deal
with the issues of ambiguity in contracts. In fact, what the Rath case actually pronounces
is that a contract must be viewed as a whole and considered in its entirety. A case cited
by the Rath court, Morgan v. Firestone, & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506, 201 P.2d 976
(1948) is referenced as establishing that provisions of a contract are to be read together
and harmonized whenever possible. SPOKANE STRUCTURES has always asserted that
the contract includes not only the Design/Build Agreement, but also the emails and other
subsequent communications.
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Further, EQUITABLE INVESTMENT cites the case of Moore v. Omnicare, Inc.,
141 Idaho 809, 118 P.3d 141 (2005), again at page five of its Reply brief, in support of
the proposition that contracts are to be construed against the drafter. SPOKANE
STRUCTURES can find no such language or implication of such in the Moore case.
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT also cites the case, Rim View Trout Co. v.
Higginson, 121 Idaho 819,828 P.2d 848 (1992). This case does not even appear to

address issues of contract law, but is rather a statutory interpretation case. EQUITABLE
INVESTMENT's brief at page 5 states: "However, ambiguity is not established merely
because a party offers a different interpretation to the court." The cited case clearly
relates to statutory interpretations and not private contracts between individuals.
The case of Luzar v. Western Sur. Co., 107 Idaho 693,692 P.2d 337 (1984), while
dealing with issues of contract interpretation, does not precisely state what EQUITABLE
INVESTMENT says it does. EQUITABLE INVESTMENT states that: "Where the court
determines that the parties' intention is clear from the language of the contract, its
interpretation and legal effect are to be resolved by the court as a matter of law."
However, Luzar does not include that statement. This mischaracterization of the case is
pointed out merely to facilitate accurate analysis of such a complex set of issues.
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT cites Mecham v. Nelson, 92 Idaho 783,451 P.2d
529 (1969) as standing for the proposition that the $605,000.00 sentence was a condition
precedent. But the case holds that the determination of the existence of a condition
precedent is "generally dependent on what the parties intended, as adduced from the
contract itself' Id at 787. EQUITABLE INVESTMENT's directions and change orders
led to the increase in the cost of construction, then as an obvious pretext, relied on the
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$605,000 term to cancel the contract. The many communications between the parties
after execution of the "Design/Build Agreement", in conjunction with the language in the
Agreement regarding change orders, either rendered the $605,000 term precatory or
amended "Design/Build Agreement" to conform to the subsequent actions of the parties.
Mecham shows that to characterize the subject term as a condition precedent is a gross

distortion of the parties' intent if adduced by the "contract".
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT cuts to the heart of the condition precedent issue at
page 8 of its Reply Brief, stating: "There remains a contract but there can be no breach."
This simple statement not only proclaims the position taken by EQUITABLE
INVESTMENT but also sums up the error of the District Court. Such a claim could not
be further from the actual definition of "contract" under American and Idaho Law.
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. (1990) at page 322, defines a contract at it most basic as:
An agreement between two or more persons which creates an obligation to
do or not to do a particular thing. As defined in Restatement, Second,
Contracts, §3: "A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach
of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in
some way recognizes as a duty." (emphasis added)
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT also cites to Rutter v. McLaughlin, IO I Idaho 292,
612 P.2d 135 (1980). It is interesting to note that the Rutter case firmly supports the
proposition that if a contract is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation it is
ambiguous; and that because the Appellant in that case did not present the entire record
of the lower court, the missing portions were presumed to support the trial court's
decision. Hence, given that Court's focus on ambiguity, the case might have gone much
differently had the record been sufficiently presented.

APPELLANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 6

EQUITABLE INVESTMENT also generally invokes Steiner v. Ziegler Tamura
Ltd., Co., 138 Idaho 238, 61 P.3d 595 (2002) (citing World Wide Lease, Inc., V.
Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880, 728 P.2d 769 (1986)) as supporting its argument regarding

conditions precedent. It is interesting to note, as with the Rutter case, that while the case
does acknowledge conditions precedent, it more importantly recognizes their limitations.
For instance, at page 599, citing World Wide Lease, the Steiner case states:
A condition precedent is an event not certain to occur, but which must
occur, before performance under a contract becomes due. A condition
precedent may be expressed in the parties' agreement, implied in fact from
the conduct of the parties, or implied in law (constructive) where the
courts "construct" a condition for the purpose of attaining a just result.
When there is a failure of a condition precedent through no fault of the
parties, no liability or duty to perform arises under the contract. A
condition precedent is distinguishable from a promise or covenant in that a
condition creates no right or duty of performance in itself and its nonoccurrence does not constitute a breach of the contract. "A promise in a
contract creates a legal duty in the promisor and a right in the promisee;
the fact or event constituting a condition creates no right or duty and is
merely a limiting or modifying factor." A covenant is a duty under the
contract, the breach of which gives a right to enforce the contract.
Id., citing World Wide Lease, Inc. v. Woodworth, I 11 Idaho 880, 887, 728 P.2d 769, 776

(Ct.App.1986) (citations omitted).
Further, and again citing World, the court stated: "As a general rule, conditions
precedent are not favored by the courts." Id.. This case certainly does not support
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT's interpretation that a condition precedent existed.
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT also invokes the nineteenth century United States
Supreme Court case of Rich v. Braxton, 158 U.S. 375 (1895), to bolster the notion that
equity should not apply where there is a remedy at law. What EQUITIBLE
INVESTMENT did not focus on was the other shoe that dropped in the Rich case. That
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venerable and long standing United States Supreme Court decision announced at page
406 that:

These authorities do not control the present question. It must be
remembered that 'it is not enough that there is a remedy at law; it must be
plain and adequate, or, in other words, as practical and efficient to the ends
of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity.' Boyce's
Exrs v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210,215; Drexel v. Berney, 122 U.S. 241, 7 S.Ct.
1200 (l 887), 252, 7 Sup. Ct. 1200; Allen v. Hanks, 136 U. S. 300, 311, 10
Sup. Ct. 961,. And the applicability of the rule depends upon the
circumstances of each case. Watson v. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74 (1867), 79.
The case of Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398,690 P.3d 333 (1984) is cited by
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT for the same reason as Rich. Similarly, Thomas drives
home the requirement that a legal remedy must be adequate:
Although there is the established principle of law that equity will not
afford relief to a plaintiff where there is an adequate remedy at law," 'it is
not enough that there is a remedy at law; it must be plain and adequate, or,
in other words, as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its
prompt administration as the remedy in equity.'" Rich v. Braxton, 158
U.S. 375,406, 15 S.Ct. 1006, 1017, 39 L.Ed. 1022 (1895) (citations
omitted); see Am.Jur.2d Equity § 94 and cases cited therein.
Thomas, 107 Idaho at 404, 690 P.3d at 339.
Many cases cited by EQUITABLE INVESTMENT are not supportive of the
position of EQUITABLE INVESTMENT. That mischaracterization again shows the
weakness of EQUITABLE INVESTMENT's position and why a trial should be held on
the matter.
3.
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT HAS FAILED TO SUCCESSFULLY REFUTE
SPOKANE STRUCTURES' ARGUMENTS

There is little doubt that the "Design/Build Agreement" could have been drafted
with greater clarity. However, no matter how poorly written this "Agreement" is,
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EQUITABLE INVESTMENT has failed to prove that SPOKANE STRUCTURES' right
to a fair and fulJ trial should be eliminated.

3.1
THE CONTRACT IS AMBIGUOUS.
It is uncontested that whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law over
which the Supreme Court exercises free review.
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT, in its Response Brief, claims that SPOKANE
STRUCTURES has waived the right to assert the existence of an ambiguity because such
claim is not pied with particularity. Such an argument was not argued in the District
Court and is inconsistent with notice pleadings. In the pleadings, SPOKANE
STRUCTURES simply asked for enforcement of contract if enforceable and if not then
equitable reimbursement of unjust enrichment. There is certainly a basis to determine
that the "Design/Build Agreement" is ambiguous.
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT failed to respond to the four reasonable interpretations
of the $605,000.00 clause in the "Design/Build Agreement."
a) EQUITABLE INVESTMENT claims that the contract between the parties was
expressly contingent upon the ability to construct the office for $605,000.00 or
less.
b) SPOKANE STRUCTURES claims the $605,000.00 was solely for the design
originally presented by EQUITABLE INVESTMENT, not new design requests.
c) SPOKANE STRUCTURES' attorneys suggest that the $605,000.00 was never a
complete cap because the change order provision always existed.
d) The District Court holds the $605,000.00 is not a cap since EQUITABLE
INVESTMENT has no obligation to build.
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT ignores this obvious ambiguity. EQUITABLE
INVESTMENT did not contest that a contract reasonably subject to conflicting
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interpretations is ambiguous. The supporting Idaho law of that proposition is clear aud
maudatory. 1 EQUITABLE INVESTMENT does not contest that "[t]he substantial intent
of the parties governs in interpreting contracts, and this is to be determined in view of the
agreement as a whole, the matters with which it deals and the circumstances under which
it was made. " 2
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT also appears not to disagree that the "contract"
between the parties consisted of a "Design/Build Agreement," as well as emails and
phone conversations.
Given the agreement on the law and the obvious conflicting reasonable
interpretations among several of the terms and phrases in the contract, the trier of fact
should inquire into the intent of the parties and the object of the transaction. "In
construing an ambiguous contract, the object to be attained should be given prime
consideration. "3
This Court should be guided by prior decisions of Werry v. Phillips Petroleum

Co., 97 Idaho 130, 540 P.2d 792 (1975), First Security Bank of Idaho v. Murphy, 131
Idaho 787, 964 P. 2d 654 (1998). Justice and fairness in resolving this as well as other
construction cases requires a trial.

3.2

A UNILATERAL RECISSION RIGHT IS
INCONSISTENT WITH IDAHO LAW

1

Spencer-Steed v, Spencer, 115 Idaho 338, 766 P.2d 1219 (l 988); Delancey v. Delancey, 110 Idaho 63,
714 P.2d 32 (1986).
2
Caldwell State Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 49 Idaho l l 0, 286 P. 360 (l 930), citing Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.
Y, 313, 119 N. E. 559, Ann. Cas. l9l8E, 247; Schurger v. Moorman, 20 Idaho, 97, l l 7 P. 122, 36 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 313, Ann. Cas. l 912D, 1114. See also Clarke v. Blackfoot Water Works, 39 Idaho 304,228 P. 326
(1924); Wilson v. Fackrell, 54 Idaho 515, 34 P.2d 409 (1934); Bratton v. Morris, 54 Idaho 743, 37 P.2d
1097 (1934).
3
Glover v. Spraker, 50 Idaho 16, 292 P. 613, 616 (] 930).
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Ambiguities are to be construed against the drafter, and the $605,000.00 clause
was authored by EQUITABLE INVESTMENT. (R 74, para. 8) The primary objective
in construing a contract is to discover the intent of the parties, and in order to effectuate
this objective, the contract must be viewed as a whole and considered in its entirety.
Doyle v. Ortega, 125 Idaho 458,461,872 P.2d 721, 724 (1994).

The "Design/Build Agreement" clearly envisioned SPOKANE STRUCTURES
going forward with the construction. This fact is evident from the change order language
and the billing based on the percentage of the construction completed. As admitted by
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT, after a series of communications, SPOKANE
STRUCTURES submitted proposed draft plans with cost exceeding $605,000.00. These
are not the final plans. It was EQUITABLE INVESTMENT's proposed modifications to
the building aesthetics that made it imperative for SPOKANE STRUCTURES to revise
the cost. (CR. 73-75). SPOKANE STRUCTURES is aware of the cost ceiling provision.
In good-faith, SPOKANE STRUCXTURES submitted an objective estimate of the cost
involved to build as per EQUITABLE INVESTMENT's requirements. If the cost is in
excess, the appropriate step for EQUITABLE INVESTMENT is to ask for further
modifications to complete the building within the stipulated budget, not repudiation
without cause. As has been repeatedly stated by EQUITABLE INVESTMENT, there
were to be draft plans until there was agreement on both cost as well as design as
previously set forth. Linda Tomblin, for EQUITABLE INVESTMENT, proposed
changes when the design was not acceptable, likewise, such changes raised the cost.
(Lewis Affidavit; R 72-77) The change in cost does not render the contract impossible.
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The intention of the parties is not clear as to the meaning of the $605,000.00
clause or the number of draft plans to be submitted before finalizing. EQUITABLE
INVESTMENT, at times, contends that the "Design/Build Agreement" is an agreement
to agree; at other times, EQUITABLE INVESTMENT contends that the contract's
$605,000.00 is a cap. Essentially, EQUITABLE INVESTMENT claims, without saying,
that the contract had a unilateral recission clause and that no event triggered the act of
recission except the whim of EQUITABLE INVESTMENT.
Recission is equitable in nature and is intended to place the parties in the positions
they occupied prior to the contract. Furthermore, recission is available only when one of
the parties has committed a material breach which destroys the entire purpose for
entering into the contract. B/inzler v. Andrews, 94 Idaho 215,485 P.2d 957 (1971) The
party desiring to rescind a contract must, prior to rescinding, tender back to the other
party any consideration or benefit received under the contract by the rescinding party.
Haines v. Rowland, 35 Idaho 481,207 P. 428 (1922); see generally 17 Am.Jur.2d

Contracts§ 512 (1964); 17A C.J.S. Contracts§ 439 (1963). EQUITABLE
INVESTMENT's claim to a "get out of contract free card" is in violation of the
obligation of personal responsibility set forth in Idaho law.
The District Court goes even further by allowing a unilateral recission without
placing the parties to the position they held prior to the "contract."
So, clearly, there is an agreement between the parties to work and engage
in good faith toward reaching an agreement for the purposes of
constructing and having a building constructed on the defendant's
property. But the contract itself does not, in fact, obligate the defendant to
actually enter into an agreement. (T. 7)
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If the "contract" requires the parties to act in good faith, then why is it

good faith to request design work and not pay for it? If the "contract" is an
agreement "to work toward having a building constructed," but "the contract itself
does not, in fact, obligate the defendant to actually enter into an agreement," then
is this not a unilateral recission of the "Design/Build Agreement?" The District
Court did err.

3.3
ALTERNATIVE PLEADINGS ARE ALLOWED UNDER IDAHO LAW
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT, in its Response Brief, and the District Court, in its
Opinion, ignore the right of alternative pleadings. SPOKANE STRUCTURES has a
legal right to make alternative pleadings to seek remedies. SPOKANE STRUCTURES
claimed breach of contract and, in the alternative, equitable claims. The plaintiffs may
allege and try their claims based on all the alternative counts. This right allows the trier
of fact to decide the ultimate relief after presentation of all evidence and a full and fair
trial. Moon v. Brewer, 89 Idaho 59, 402 P.2d 973 (1965). Full satisfaction attained by
means of one of the alternate remedies would eliminate the other. Id Dickerson v.

Brewster, 88 Idaho 330(1965) allowed three alternate and inconsistent grounds for
recovery under IRCP 8(e)(2). Under I.R.C.P. 8(e)(2), a party may plead alternatively,
hypothetically, and may state as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of
consistency and whether based on legal or equitable grounds or both.

3.4
COST CEILING IS NOT A CONDITION PRECEDENT
The "Design/Build Agreement" gave change order and billing instructions. These
two provisions indicate that EQUITABLE INVESTMENT is obligated to proceed with
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the construction. Just as EQUITABLE INVESTMENT proposed changes to aesthetics, it
is entitled to propose changes to the cost and SPOKANE STRUCTURES was and is
ready to construct the building within the contemplated cost of $605,000.00. The only
condition precedent is the financing and none other as is evident from the plain language
of the contract in dispute.
In Kessler v. Tortoise Development, Inc., 130 Idaho 105, 937 P.2d 417 (1997),
937 P.2d 417 (1997), the court ruled that the purchase agreement was ambiguous because
there was no certainty about which provision controlled the agreement, the title provision
or the default provision. As in Kessler, the contract in the present case is ambiguous as to
whether or not there is cost ceiling or there is scope for variation in the construction cost
on account of the presence of the change order provision. EQUITABLE INVESTMENT
claims that the change order language only applies to the construction phase. That is not
what the change order language states (CR. 34). The change order language expressly
negates the ceiling on the construction cost and proves that the $605,000.00 was never
intended to be a condition precedent.
3.5
SPOKANE STRUCTRUES IS ENTITILED TO EQUITABLE RELIEF

When the contract is ambiguous the party is entitled to equitable remedies if there
is no remedy at law. Equitable "[relief] will be granted when in view of all the
circumstances, to deny it would permit one of the parties to suffer a gross wrong at the
hands of the other party, who brought about the condition." Thisted v. Country Club
Tower Corp., 146 Mont. 87,405 P.2d 432,436 (1965), quoting Fey v. A.A. Oil Corp.,

129 Mont. 300, 285 P.2d 578, 587 (I 955). By ruling that the contract is unambiguous,
when there are reasonable conflicting interpretations possible, the District Court made an
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error. By ruling that a contract to work toward an agreement to construct a building is the
only contract, but enough of a contract to stop any equitable relief for sums paid and
benefits given results in a serious injustice to SPOKANE STRUCTURES.
3.6

A CONTRACT MUST BE CONSIDERED IN ITS ENTIRETY
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT and the District Court failed to consider all the
provisions that supported the claims presented by SPOKANE STRUCTURES, but also
did not take the evidence presented in the form of communications and testimony
between the parties, which certainly was a part of the express contract. In doing so, the
finding of fact and reasonable conclusions in favor of the moving party are in violation of
the spirit and wording of the summary judgment rule.
3.7

AN AGREEMENT TO AGREE IS UNENFORCEABLE
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT, in the conclusion section of"Respondent's Brief'
at the bottom of page 10, states that the contract was "an agreement to agree." Such a
conclusion is a profound and accurate statement of the error and bespeaks the confusion
inherent in the ruling of the District Court. It is firmly established under the law ofldaho
that "agreements to agree" are unenforceable. The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear
the legal status of agreements to agree:
Generally, an agreement to agree is unenforceable, as its terms are so
indefinite that it fails to show a mutual intent to create an enforceable
obligation .... No enforceable contract comes into being when parties leave
a material term for future negotiations, creating a mere agreement to
agree." 17A AmJur.2d Contracts§ 181 (2004).
Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc:., 141 Idaho 604,614, 114 P.3d 974,984 (2005)
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Even without the inclusion of the term "agreement to agree," the courts are clear
that incomplete, indefinite and uncertain contracts cannot be enforced.
A contract will be enforced if it is "complete, definite and certain in all its
material terms, or contains provisions which are capable in themselves of
being reduced to certainty." Giacobbi Square v. PEK Corp., 105 Idaho
346,348,670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983) (emphasis omitted). To meet this
standard the contract must embody a distinct understanding of the parties,
showing a meeting of the minds as to all necessary terms of the contract.
E.g., C.H Leavell and Co. v. Grafe & Associates, Inc., 90 Idaho 502,414
P.2d 873 (1966). The obligations of the parties must be identified so that
the adequacy of performance can be ascertained. Dale's Service Co., v.
Jones, 96 Idaho 662, 534 P.2d 1102 (I 975). If terms necessary to a
contract are left for future negotiation, the contract cannot be enforced.
Brothers v. Arave, 67 Idaho 171, 174 P.2d 202 (1946).
Dursteler v. Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230,233,697 P.2d 1244, 1247 (1985)

EQUITABLE INVESTMENT concedes that the subject contract is an "agreement
to agree." The District Court's holding is the same, although stated differently. The
District Court states, "clearly, there is an agreement between the parties to work ...
toward reaching an agreement." (T. 7, 1111-15) Consequently, SPOKANE
STRUCTURES should be entitled to equitable remedies.

CONCLUSION
This appeal presents seven issues:

I.

Did the District Court err in holding that the heart of this issue is a breach of
contract?

2.

Did the District Court err in holding that the contract is clear and unambiguous?

3.

Did the District Court err in holding that an express contract which does not
require any performance by one party is a valid contract?

4.

Did the District Court err in holding that no equitable remedies lie in the matter?

5.

Did the District Court draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
party?
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6.

Did the District Court liberally construe all facts of record in favor of the
nonmoving party?

7.

Did the District Court err in finding no contested issues of material facts?
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT has failed to adequately respond to the seven

issues or to prove any reason the summary judgment should not be reversed. The District
Court did err in holding that the heart of the case is a clear and unambiguous contract that
was not breached. Idaho law does not allow agreements to agree that give one party the
right to ignore performance. Alternative pleadings allow equitable rights to be pled and
considered. Finally, the District Court's application of the summary judgment rule is
erroneous because of its failure to draw reasonable inferences in favor of SPOKANE
STRUCTURES, to liberally construe all facts in favor of SPOKANE STRUCTURES,
and its failure to find contested issues of material facts.
In conclusion, based on the above reply to the arguments presented by
EQUITABLE INVESTMENT, SPOKANE STRUCTURES prays that the
District Court's grant of summary judgment be reversed.
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